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ABSTRACT
Friendship and hedonism are both major components of Epicureanism. I attempt to
relieve the tension that seems to follow from endorsing both of these. I argue that Epicurean
friendships require valuing a friend’s well-being in the same way as one’s own and that
embarking on such friendships is what David Schmidtz terms a maieutic end – one that is
achieved by taking on a new set of ends. This conception fits with other-regarding concern that is
espoused throughout the Epicurean texts discussing friendship and, as I argue, remains consistent
with other psychological and ethical commitments of Epicureanism.
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1
1.

INTRODUCTION
Friendship and hedonism are both embraced by the Epicureans. On the face of it, holding

both of these as central to one’s philosophy seems problematic. Generally speaking, an egoistic
hedonist refers only to her own pleasure when determining her actions, and friendship is often
thought to require valuing another’s well-being for its own sake. In this paper I argue that such a
tension is relieved within Epicureanism.
Torquatus, the Epicurean spokesperson in Cicero’s On Moral Ends, explains that seeking
out friendships is motivated by hedonistic considerations, as friendship is sought solely because
the greatest pleasure for oneself will be attained by doing so. However, Torquatus also states that
friends must love each other at least as much as they do themselves (DF I 67).1 This gives rise to
an apparent problem for Epicurean friendship – I must love my friend in order to attain for
myself the greatest amount of pleasure. There seems to be a serious conflict between ends in
such a friendship. In this thesis, I argue that the Epicurean position on friendship should be
understood as follows: one decides that she ought to pursue loving friendships by way of an
egoistic utility calculation, and, once she has made the decision to love her friends, a person
values the pleasure of her friends for its own sake, the same way she does her own pleasure.
Thus, friendships are instrumentally valuable for the pleasant life they provide, yet the wellbeing of friends comes to be valued for its own sake, as a means to no further end.
In chapter two of this thesis, I describe Epicureanism’s take on pleasure and reason, both
of which are vital to properly understanding friendships, and I describe the role of the

1

Henceforward, references to ancient texts will follow these conventions: Cicero’s De Finibus (On Goals) = DF;
Kyriai Doxai (Principal Doctrines) = KD; Sententiae Vaticanae (Vatican Sayings) = SV; Epicurus’ Letter to
Menoeceus = Ep. Men.; Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things) = DRN; and Diogenes Laertius,
Lives of the Philosophers = DL. Translations, unless otherwise noted: DF – Raphael Woolf, 2001; DRN – Martin
Ferguson Smith, 2001; KD, SV, Ep. Men., and DL – Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson, in Hellenistic Philosophy, 2nd
ed., 1997.
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community in providing the structure for such friendships. However, given the scanty remains of
Epicurus’ own writings, this exegesis is situated within a heavily debated area of Epicureanism,

and I appeal to David Schmidtz’s work on ends in order to flesh out what I argue is the correct
Epicurean position on the rationale behind choosing ends.
In the third chapter I give an overview of the philosophical debate surrounding the
characterization of Epicurean friendship. There are two prominent but competing views on the
topic. Julia Annas and Phillip Mitsis hold that friendship in Epicureanism is other-regarding and
that this is inconsistent with commitments in Epicurean psychology and ethics. Tim O’Keefe,
Eric Brown and Matthew Evans, on the other hand, hold that Epicurean friendship is purely selfregarding, and is thus consistent with the whole of Epicureanism. I argue that Epicurus actually
held neither of these positions, but rather espoused the view that is wedged between them –
friendship is other-regarding, and this other-regard is consistent with the rest of Epicureanism.
In chapter four I argue that the Epicureans did, in fact, hold that friends should be valued
for their own sakes. I provide textual support for this conclusion from Cicero’s On Moral Ends,
and I also argue that Epicurean egoism recommends that friends be valued in this way. My
argument from egoism appeals to a thought experiment to show that a community where
everyone values the well-being of a friend for its own sake is the best environment for living a
tranquil life, which is Epicureanism’s telos. As such, living in a community of other-regarding
friends is the end towards which Epicurean egoists should strive, and the type of friendship
embraced in such a community is the one Epicurus embraced, or at least is that which he should
have endorsed.
Finally, in the fifth chapter I explain how an Epicurean would come to engender other-

3
regarding friendships. I argue that entering into such relationships is the equivalent to pursuing
what David Schmidtz terms a maieutic end. A maieutic end is one that is achieved by taking on a
new set of ends.2 In the case of a friendship, the new set of ends one must pursue includes the
well-being of one’s friend as a final end. With friendship understood in this way, I argue that
Epicurean friendship avoids the psychological doublethink that may seem inherent in embracing
a friendship where one values a friend’s well-being for its own sake because doing so will further
one’s own interests. I argue that valuing friends for their own sakes does not undermine
Epicurean hedonism and is tenable within Epicurean psychology.
2

OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT EPICUREAN TENETS

2.1

Pleasure
Epicurus believed a pleasant life is the telos, the end that is a means to no further end and

towards which all else is a means (DF I 29, 42). His primary reason for holding this view was the
“Cradle Argument.” The Epicurean variant of this argument claims that infants immediately seek
only their own pleasure. This is supposed to show that pleasure is the natural goal of life, and
thus we should structure our lives around achieving our own pleasure, as babies do not hold false
beliefs that could cloud their judgment of what is good.3
Annas believes that the Epicureans espoused the commonly accepted Aristotelian view
that the telos is “complete,” in that all of one’s ends are aimed at this one final end. In fact,
Annas finds fault with Epicurean ethics for holding that pleasure can serve as such a complete
end, arguing that there are good parts of life that are not aimed at one’s own tranquility, such as

2

Schmidtz (1995) 61.
For the Epicurean version of the Cradle Argument, see DF I 30 and II 30-33. O’Keefe (2010) 113-115 provides an
overview of the function of the Cradle Argument in Epicureanism and how it relates to the versions put forward by
other philosophical schools.

3
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virtue.4 However, support for attributing to Epicurus such an all-encompassing understanding of
the telos as to require that all ends a person has are aimed at one’s own pleasure is scant,5 and it
does not seem that holding pleasure to be a complete end is warranted in the least by the Cradle
Argument. Thus, when discussing the telos, I do so with a weaker sense in mind than Annas has.
On my view of Epicureanism, living a pleasant life is the telos, or the ultimate goal of life. I
develop this understanding more clearly in the next section, but for now it suffices to note that
Epicurus unequivocally held that pleasure (tranquility) is the highest good.
While Epicurus held that all pleasure is good, some pleasures are not choice-worthy, as it
is sometimes necessary to choose to incur some pain with the anticipation that greater pleasure
will result in the long run. Likewise, one must sometimes choose to forgo some pleasure, with
the foresight that embracing this pleasure will lead to an intensely painful state (Ep. Men. 129).
Epicurus does not explicitly distinguish between necessary and unnecessary pain, but he implies
that there is such a distinction in his acknowledgment that some pains should be undertaken as a
necessary means to secure greater pleasure or to avoid greater pain (Ep. Men. 129). These pains
are what I refer to as “necessary,” as they are required to reach the desired end.
Epicurus’ notion of pleasure is further developed by his making two distinctions between
different pleasures: kinetic and static pleasures that differ in kind, and bodily and mental
pleasures that differ in degree. The following table sorts out different pleasures along these lines:

4

Annas (1993) 188.
The main source on this point is Cicero’s On Moral Ends, where Torquatus identifies the telos as that to which
everything else is an end (DF I 29 and 42), but Cicero’s account is sprinkled with his own flourishes on Epicurean
doctrines. It seems quite plausible that Cicero is simply putting his own understanding in the Epicureans’ mouths,
perhaps incidentally, in order to clarify that the meaning of telos is not lost in translation from Greek to Latin, which
is one of the purposes of DF I, according to Cicero himself (DF I 1).

5
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TABLE 1.1 Types of Pleasure6
Kinetic

Static/Katastematic

Bodily Titillation of the senses or the process
of fulfilling a bodily desire

Not being in bodily pain, including having all
bodily appetites/desires fulfilled (aponia)

Mental Joy of reflecting upon past, present, or
future pleasures

Having confidence of being free from pain in
the future, having no regrets of the past and
being generally content with life (ataraxia)

Kinetic pleasures are those arising from 1. the titillation of the senses, such as tasting something
that is pleasantly sweet, 2. being in the process of fulfilling a desire, such as being in the act of
eating barley cakes to sate hunger, or 3. joyful reflection on some past, present, or future
pleasure, such as remembering how good those barley cakes really were. These pleasures are
active, in the sense that they involve some movement of the senses or the mind.7 Kinetic
pleasures, understood by the likes of the Cyrenaics to be hedonism’s highest good, are taken by
the Epicureans to be inferior to static pleasures (Ep. Men. 131). While valuable for their own
sakes, kinetic pleasures are not to be sought with the same vigor as static pleasure. Static
pleasure constitutes living pleasantly, and is thus the Epicurean telos.
Static pleasure is a different kind of pleasure than kinetic pleasure. Static pleasure is
being in the passive state of lacking pain, and, like kinetic pleasures, static pleasures come in
both bodily and mental forms. Aponia, or lacking bodily pain, is straightforwardly defined – one

6

This chart is adapted from O’Keefe (2010) 117-120, which provides an overview of the Epicurean distinctions
regarding pleasure, as they are put forward in DF I, DL X, DRN III, KD and SV.
7
Epicurus believes the mind is composed of atoms, so describing it as undergoing “movement” is appropriate.
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is in aponia when she is not presently feeling bodily pain.8 Aponia is the conjunction of not
having a throbbing headache, nor suffering the pangs of hunger, nor having unsatisfied bodily
desires, and so on for every bodily pain. Ataraxia, often and appropriately translated
“tranquility,” is the lacking of mental pain, and this type of pleasure is not as straightforwardly
defined as the others. Ataraxia is the lack of “regret, fear, and anxiety”9 that arises from the
conjunction of not being in distress over one’s past, being confident that one will be in the state
of aponia in the future, and being in a state of general contentment about life, which includes not
fearing death or the gods. Also, where aponia is partially constituted by having all bodily desires
fulfilled, ataraxia requires having all mental desires fulfilled. For “it is from desire that enmity,
discord, dissension, sedition, and war is born. … Wisdom alone will free us from the onrush of
appetite” (DF I 44, 46). To be in the optimal state of static pleasure (tranquility), one must have
no unfulfilled desires and be worry-free about the present and the future. Torquatus claims that
ataraxia is the “highest pleasure” (DF I 38). It is of a higher degree of pleasure than aponia, and,
as a form of static pleasure, is more desirable than kinetic pleasures because it is the most
important constituent of living pleasantly (the telos).
In addition to the distinction between kinetic and static pleasure, the Epicureans also
distinguish between mental and bodily pleasures that differ by degree. The details of the
distinction between these pleasures are difficult to parse and debatable, but a complete
characterization of this distinction is not as important for my project as is the relation between
mental and bodily pleasures. Torquatus claims that “mental pleasure and pain may be much
greater than bodily pleasure and pain” (DF I 58), and Epicurus is famous for having said that the
joy (kinetic mental pleasure) of reminiscing about past pleasurable discussions with a friend

8
9

For the Epicureans, all pain is kinetic.
O’Keefe (2010) 120.
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outweighed his “unsurpassed” bodily pain on his deathbed (DL X 22). Intense mental pleasure
can eclipse and neutralize one’s bodily pain. Thus, one should strive to achieve mental pleasure,
as having mental pleasure is essential for living pleasantly.
Understanding these different types of pleasure is necessary in order to understand
Epicurean friendship. Friendship is supposed to be indispensable in the pursuit of ataraxia. It
gives me the confidence that, in the future, my friends will help me satisfy my then-present
bodily needs, and thus, in the future, I will be more likely to attain aponia (DF I 66). Friendship
is good insofar as it helps me attain ataraxia. Confidence in my future well-being is much more
important than the actual help my friends may end up providing in times of need, as Epicurus
states, “We do not need utility from our friends so much as we need confidence concerning that
utility” (SV 34). Having loyal friends is a vital component of being able to live tranquilly, and the
way one comes to understand that one should seek out friends is through rational calculation
regarding one’s own utility.
2.2

Reason and Choosing Ends
Epicurus has an instrumental conception of reason. Reason is used to determine which

beliefs, desires, and actions will best lead to the state of lacking pain – aponia and ataraxia.
Reason performs “sober calculation which searches out the reasons for every choice and
avoidance and drives out the opinions which are the source of the greatest turmoil for men’s
souls” (Ep. Men. 132). Reason is an instrument that can help rid our lives of unnecessary pain by
identifying unnecessary desires and troublesome beliefs about the world, ones that we can then
purge from our sets of desires and beliefs.
Epicurus thinks that we should use reason to determine which ends, if pursued, will result
in the most pleasant life. Rational deliberation allows us to figure out which ends are most
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desirable, or, in other words, which ends, if pursued, have the best chance of resulting in
tranquility in mind and painlessness in body. In discussing the ends/objects of desire we should
seek, Epicurus states, “some [desires] are necessary for happiness and some for freeing the body
from troubles and some for life itself. The unwavering contemplation of these enables one to
refer every choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the freedom of the soul from
disturbance, since this is the goal of a blessed life” (Ep. Men. 127-128). David Schmidtz’s
discussion of choosing ends in Rational Choice and Moral Agency is helpful in clarifying how
reason functions in determining the ends we should pursue. The Epicurean writings we have do
not expound on choosing ends in the way that Schmidtz does, but Schmidtz develops his
understanding of a final end in much the same way as the Epicureans – a final end is one that is
pursued for its own sake, not for the sake of any other end.10 Given this understanding of a final
end, Schmidtz then discusses a process by which one can determine the proper ends to pursue for
their own sake.
Schmidtz claims that there is a “distinction between pursuing a final end (which by
definition we do for its own sake) and choosing a final end (which we might do for various
reasons).”11 Bringing this distinction to bear on Epicurean hedonism, we pursue our final ends
because we think that attaining them will be pleasurable and will help us live pleasantly. To
quote Cicero’s formulation of the Epicurean telos, pleasure “is that which is a means to no other
end, but rather is itself the end of all other things” (DF I 42). This is what makes an end final for
the Epicureans – that its achievement is pleasurable. If achieving an end is pleasurable, then
there is no further reason needed for a person to pursue it. For instance, I pursue the final end of
not being hungry, a static pleasure, because attaining this end is inherently pleasurable and is a

10
11

Cf. DF I 29 and 42 and Schmidtz (1995) 60.
Schmidtz (1995) 61.
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partial constituent of aponia. Getting food, on the other hand, is not a final end, but an
instrumental one, as it is not inherently pleasurable when achieved, yet getting food is a goal that
can serve one well in the pursuit of his final ends. Having food can be instrumental in achieving
my final end of lacking hunger, but getting food is only pleasurable insofar as it brings about my
final end of not being hungry.
While I pursue my final ends because their attainment is pleasurable, my choice of which
final ends to pursue is based on other reasons having to do with a given end’s relation to the
telos. Some pleasures are greater than others on the Epicurean account, and I want ends that, if
pursued, will lead me to the greatest pleasure, tranquility, the goal of life (telos). Thus, reason
shows me that the final ends I should choose to pursue, and the things that I should desire, are
those that are necessary for living a tranquil life.
To explain this another way, on the Epicurean view, having sexual intercourse is a final
end. When achieved, this end is pleasurable, and thus the end is good and worth pursuing for its
own sake (all pleasure is good according to Epicurus). However, pursuing this final end is not
advisable on the Epicurean account, as doing so is antithetical to satisfying one’s desires, an
essential component of ataraxia. One should not choose to pursue the final end of sexual love.
Lucretius puts this point quite poetically in discussing the plight of lovers who pursue “the bonds
of Venus”:
At length, when the accumulated desire has burst from their genitals, there is a
brief respite in their raging passion. Then the same madness returns, and they
have another fit of frenzy: they seek to attain what they desire, but fail to find an
effective antidote to their suffering: in such deep doubt do they pine away with an
invisible wound (DRN IV 1115-1121).
Sexual love is a very intense pleasure and can serve as a final end for this reason. However,
Lucretius urges his reader to refrain from pursuing such an end because this end does not fit well
within a set of ends that make living pleasantly a real possibility. Sexual love is an end that

10
hinders tranquility. All pleasures are good, yet since we all want to live pleasantly (doing so is
the goal of life), we should often refrain from pursuing some of these goods, like sexual
intercourse, in order to make it possible to live a tranquil life. Tranquility is the measure by
which we choose which ends are the ones we should pursue. Thus, Lucretius states that “[t]he

man who avoids love does not deprive himself of the joys of Venus, but rather chooses those that
involve no penalty” (DRN IV 1073-1074, emphasis added).
This picture of choosing which pleasures to pursue is what Epicurus has in mind when he
urges us to limit our desires to those that are natural and necessary. Epicurus distinguishes
between natural-necessary desires, natural-unnecessary desires, and unnatural-unnecessary
desires (Ep. Men. 127).12 He holds that limiting our desires to those that aim at natural-necessary
ends, such as the desire for a full stomach in general, is the best way to ensure that we avoid the
pain of having unsatisfied desires. One benefits greatly in pursuing the end of not being hungry it is easily achieved, and it is essential for the continuation of a pleasant life. If all I desire is to
achieve ends like having a full stomach, a quenched thirst, and some shelter, then my desires are
easy to satisfy because these ends are easily achieved. These are good ends to choose to pursue –
they are choiceworthy, because pursuing them will lead me to living a tranquil life. When I
desire things that are unobtainable, such as the unnatural-unnecessary ends of immortality and
becoming one with my sexual partner,13 or things that are difficult to obtain, such as the naturalunnecessary ends of owning a mansion (some particular kind of shelter) or eating bluefin tuna
(some particular kind of food), I find myself with either an impossible or a difficult task,
12

See also KD XXVI, XXIX (especially scholiast’s note), and XXX for textual support for my exposition here. I am
referring to vain and empty desires as unnatural-unnecessary so that the name parallels the others. Annas (1993) puts
a great deal of weight on the notion of “empty desires” in antiquity, but even her position is amenable to using
“unnatural” in its place. See Annas (1993) chapter 7.
13
For a more detailed treatment of immortality and sexual love, see Ep. Men. 124 and DRN 1073-1121, respectively.
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respectively, in achieving the ends that I desire. It is rational to pursue ends that have the best
chance of resulting in aponia and ataraxia, and these are the ends that Epicurus calls natural and
necessary.
Epicurus acknowledges that, while our final ends are always those we think are
pleasurable (psychological hedonism), we can seek or desire harmful pleasures if we lack the
foresight and understanding that we must sometimes make sacrifices to achieve confidence that
we will avoid future dangers. For “those who do not know how to seek pleasure rationally great
pains ensue. … [P]leasures are rejected when this results in greater pleasures; pains are selected
when this avoids worse pains” (DF I 32-33). Since not all pleasures are choiceworthy for
Epicurus, one must use reason to determine which ends, if chosen, will best lead to a tranquil
life. This rational process of choosing ends leads us to choose to become friends with others
because “[s]olitude, and a life without friends, is filled with fear and danger; so reason herself
bids us to acquire friends” (DF I 66), and “Epicurus’ view is that of all the things which wisdom
procures to enable us to live happily, there is none greater, richer or sweeter than friendship” (DF
I 65). Rational friendship, the type of friendship that will best free us from fear and danger, is the
type of friendship that would be the ideal object of desire for the Epicureans. I characterize the
type of friendship that I think is most rational for Epicureans in the next chapter, and a major
component of this type of friendship is that it ideally takes place within the confines of a
community of like-minded Epicureans.
2.3

Community
A proper understanding of Epicurean friendship should take into account the Epicurean

community, as friendship is ideally undertaken within such a community. A significant
characteristic of the community is that, since individual friendships are connected in a communal
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network of friends, there is significant pressure from all in the community to act properly
towards one’s friends. This communal pressure to stay in line is buttressed by the Epicurean
belief that “[i]t is hard to commit injustice and escape detection, but to be confident of escaping
detection is impossible” (SV 7). For the Epicurean, betraying a friend would cause long-term
pain (worry) that would outweigh any immediate pleasure gained by doing so. Either one will be
found out, in which case she must suffer the wrath of the community, or, potentially worse, one
will not be found out and will bear the burden of worry for the rest of her days. Thus, there are
hedonistic and communal forces at work that require one to be loyal to one’s friends when
ataraxia is the ultimate goal.
A good place to see the extent of the pressure to act properly in an Epicurean community
is a discussion in Martha Nussbaum’s “Therapeutic Arguments: Epicurus and Aristotle,” where
she lays out the following scenario:
It is likely that Epicurus was not averse to ‘mixing in’ such incentives as the threat
of isolation from the philia of the community. Take for example the ominous
letter written by Epicurus to an anonymous child: ‘Know well, that the reason
why both I and all the others love you so much is that you are always entirely
obedient to them (Us. 176).’ ... If the reason for love is obedience, then
disobedience will bring about the withdrawal of love.14
The pertinent aspect of this passage for my project is the community’s expectation that the child
will be obedient. If the child fails to obey, then the community will react as a whole in its
withdrawal of love. One could argue that Nussbaum reads Epicurus’ letter to the child as making
a stronger claim than is actually intended, as she moves from the reason for the community’s
love of the child being his obedience, to the view that this love will be withdrawn if the child
becomes disobedient. It is a possibility that, while obedience is the reason for the community’s
love, the community will continue to love the child even if he disobeys, but Epicurus simply
14

Nussbaum, 1986, 43.
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implies differently for the sake of his letter. Regardless, there is additional support for the view
that there is grave consequence for betraying a friendship, and this is the aspect of communal
pressure that is important for my current project.
KD XL states, “All those who had the power to acquire the greatest confidence from [the
threats posed by] their neighbours also thereby lived together most pleasantly with the surest
guarantee.” From the fact that fear results from one’s betrayal of a friend in an Epicurean
community, it follows that one’s confidence in the future will be undermined should one fail to
hold up his end of the bargain in a friendship, as the community will no longer love a traitor as a
friend. The communal pressure to make good on one’s commitments provides the confidence
that friends are legitimate.
This facet of Epicureanism plays a significant role in opening the possibility for the
friends-are-to-be-valued-instrumentally interpretive position against which I will be arguing in
the next chapter. The threat of ostracism tips the egoistic utility scales in favor of always helping
a friend, even if one only values a friend’s ends instrumentally. Being disloyal carries far more
painful possible consequences than does making even large sacrifices for a friend. Disloyalty,
while perhaps leading to the avoidance of a great deal of short-term pain, is nearly fatal for the
prospect of attaining tranquility in the future. Even if one’s disloyalty is not found out by others,
“until his death it will be uncertain whether he will continue to escape detection” (KD XXXV).
This uncertainty will lead to serious worry that will undermine one’s confidence for the future.
Betrayal will thus be more detrimental to ataraxia than if one confesses one’s shortcomings,
accepts punishment, and works to regain the good graces of others. One should “[l]et nothing be
done in your life which will cause you to fear if it is discovered by your neighbor” (SV 70).
Being loyal, on the other hand, makes one an excellent candidate for others to befriend and goes

14
a long way towards securing future tranquility.
While the communal aspect of Epicureanism does open the door for interpretations of
Epicurean friendship that differ from my own, it is vital to the plausibility of my proposal over
and against opposing views, and community should play a significant role in any interpretation
of the Epicurean position on friendship. In the next chapter, I characterize the debate surrounding
Epicurean friendship to which my thesis contributes. Then in chapter four I invoke a thought
experiment to show that valuing the well-being of one’s friends will better help one achieve
tranquility than the alternative. This argument for my position on friendship relies heavily on the
communal aspect of Epicureanism.
3

FRIENDSHIP AND VALUING OTHERS
Epicureans held that “[w]e cannot maintain a stable and lasting enjoyment of life without

friendship; nor can we maintain friendship itself unless we love our friends no less than we do
ourselves” (DF I 67). The general consensus among Epicurean scholars is that, if “love” here
means that one should value a friend’s pleasure in its own right, then there is an inconsistency
between Epicurean friendship and hedonism. In The Morality of Happiness, Julia Annas claims
that Epicurus’ notion of friendship, while other-regarding, is inconsistent with his hedonism.15
This position echoes that of Phillip Mitsis in Epicurus’ Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of
Invulnerability, where he claims that any other-regarding concern “sharply conflicts with
Epicurus’ much-repeated claim that only one’s own pleasure is the telos of action and desirable
for itself.”16 Tim O’Keefe agrees that ascribing both altruism and hedonism to Epicurus would
lead to an inconsistency, but he holds that Epicurean friendship is instead purely self-regarding
and that Epicureans must take “love” behaviorally in the above dictum, instead of as requiring
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one to value another’s well-being for its own sake.17 Variations on O’Keefe’s line are put forward
by both Matthew Evans and Eric Brown, who also claim that there is no genuine other-regard in
Epicurean friendship. Evans argues that instrumentally valued friendship is partially constitutive
of tranquility, and thus partially constitutive of the telos and to be chosen for its own sake.18
Brown claims that friendship is not other-regarding, is not constitutive of tranquility, and is not to
be chosen as an end in itself. However, he holds that “every action that is required for friendship
sustains the greatest pleasure, precisely because it sustains the friendship that supports
tranquility.”19 Thus, Brown argues that the Epicureans were right to hold self-regarding
friendship as central to their philosophy and that they do so consistently.
My position, in opposition to those just outlined, is that Epicurean friendship is genuinely
other-regarding (contra O’Keefe, Evans and Brown), in that one should value a friend’s painless
state (tranquility) for its own sake, or as a means to no further end. I also believe that such a
position is consistent with Epicurean hedonism (contra Mitsis and Annas) because, while
friends’ ends are to be valued for their own sakes, friendships are to be sought on purely
hedonistic grounds.
A similar position to mine is put forward in Daniel Russell’s “Epicurus on Friends and
Goals.” He provides a picture of Epicurean hedonism that is different from my own, but we both
come to the conclusion that this hedonism is consistent with other-regard, for which I argue in
chapter five. Another place where Russell and I part company is in the way we justify holding
the position that Epicurean friendship is genuinely other-regarding. Russell’s argument for this
position exclusively relies on SV 23, an intensely controversial Epicurean saying, and on SV 39,
neither of which provides sufficient evidence for the thoroughly other-regarding concern that
17
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Russell and I ultimately claim is present in Epicurean friendship.20
SV 39 states, “The constant friend is neither he who always searches for utility, nor he
who never links [friendship to utility]. For the former makes gratitude a matter for commercial
transaction, while the latter kills off good hope for the future.” Russell thinks that this first
sentence implies that there is genuine other-regarding concern in Epicurean friendship,21 as one
must seek something other than his own pleasure in order to be a good friend. However, this
saying does not necessitate that other-regarding concern is a component of friendship. O’Keefe
argues, for instance, that one ought to act towards a friend’s pleasure in the same way one acts
towards one’s own. He also denies that a friend’s pleasure is valuable except in a strictly selfregarding sense; a friend is valuable only insofar as he brings me pleasure.22 Yet, O’Keefe’s
position can consistently maintain that one should not always “search for utility” in dealing with
a friend, as doing so makes one a lousy friend. Imagine a friend who only lends a hand when
doing so provides for his own utility. There is no valuing of anyone other than oneself on
O’Keefe’s view, yet SV 39 seems wholly compatible with his position. A self-absorbed friend
will not be very popular, and the loss of friendships that result from total selfishness will be
detrimental to ataraxia. Even if one completely rejects other-regard in friendship, as O’Keefe
does, SV 39 can be fully understandable and relevant. This saying cannot establish that there is
any valuing of a friend for her own sake in Epicurean friendship, as it can be accommodated well
on views that completely reject other-regard as a component of friendship.
Russell’s other textual support for thinking Epicurean friendship involves other-regarding
concern is SV 23, which literally reads (without an often accepted emendation), “Every
friendship is a virtue for its own sake, though it takes its origin from the benefits [it confers on
20
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us].” As stated, this does not imply that other-regarding concern is a component of friendship.
However, there is only one surviving source for this saying, and it is plausible that there is a
mistake in this manuscript. Most commentators argue that aretē, or “virtue,” which appears in
our only source for the saying, should be replaced with hairetē, which means “worth choosing.”
Thus, the emended saying would read, “Every friendship is worth choosing for its own sake,
though it takes its origin from the benefits [it confers on us].” Inwood and Gerson, in their
Hellenistic Philosophy, note that they “regard the emendation as virtually certain, though the
transmitted text has been defended.”23
Russell agrees with this emendation without providing any argument that it is
warranted.24 This is problematic because some of the opponents of the other-regardingfriendships view see no conclusive reasons for making the emendation. Among those who think
the original text may be correct are O’Keefe and Brown, neither of whom would accept Russell’s
view on account that it relies heavily on SV 23 for ascribing other-concern to Epicurean
friendships. While neither O’Keefe nor Brown is certain that the text is correct as it is, both
propose that either SV 23 is correct without the emendation and thus does not support any
claims to intrinsically valued friendships, or the emendation is appropriate, in which case the
saying should be attributed to a later Epicurean rather than to Epicurus himself (the latter being
a possibility that is wholly overlooked by Russell). I don’t agree with all of their arguments for
not emending the text, 25 and there may be good reasons to make the change. However, that the
value of friendships is found in the security and confidence they provide (and not in itself) seems
right in light of other components of Epicureanism, as I argued at the end of the “Reason and
choosing ends” section in the last chapter. Also, in criticizing the Epicurean notion of friendship,
23
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Cicero states, “One of your [Torquatus’] claims I seemed to recognize as a dictum of Epicurus
himself, namely that friendship cannot be divorced from pleasure, and should be cultivated for
the very reason that no life can be pleasant without it, since without it no life can be secure from
fear” (DF II 82). It seems clear that, unless Cicero is confused, Epicurus held friendship to be
instrumentally valuable and could not have held that friendships are worth choosing for their
own sake without being inconsistent.
Given this controversy surrounding SV 23, accepting the emendation without argument
and taking the saying to be indicative of the orthodox Epicurean position seems problematic,
especially if SV 23 is supposed to serve as the primary foundation for one’s view, which it does
for Russell. Therefore, I remain agnostic on the correct reading of this text. The best way to deal
with SV 23, in my opinion, is to characterize the Epicurean position on friendship using other
texts, and then see which reading of SV 23 fits best with this well-supported position. I will do
the former in this paper and leave the latter project to another venue.
While I am not willing to admit that friendships are valuable for their own sakes, as the
emended SV 23 claims, it is important to recognize the difference between valuing a friendship
for its own sake and valuing a friend for her own sake, or her well-being for its own sake. I
believe that the latter is a component of the Epicurean view on friendship. Brown delineates this
distinction, and his demonstrative example is decisive: I may value my student’s well-being for
its own sake, while not valuing the teacher-student relationship in this way at all, just as I can
value a friend’s well-being for its own sake, while not valuing the relation between us (the
friendship itself) for its own sake. So, even if emended to claim that friendship is valuable for its
own sake, SV 23 would still not warrant the attribution of intrinsic value to a friend, which both
Russell and I hold to be a vital part of Epicureanism.
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Even though I think Russell’s reasons for admitting that friendships require other-concern
are weak, I do believe that Epicurean friendships are best understood as involving other-concern,
and I argue as such in the next chapter. Before doing so, however, I should first overcome a

potentially devastating roadblock to the plausibility of my thesis that Epicureanism endorses
other-regarding friendships.
This obstacle to my position is put forward by Matthew Evans, and in answering it I will
hopefully both clarify my view and overcome an objection that my view should be rejected out
of hand. Evans claims that “the self-regarding attitudes prescribed by the egoist hedonism are
incompatible with the other-regarding attitudes required of genuine friends.”26 These otherregarding attitudes consist in the endorsement of “the valuation condition,” which Evans
formulates: “If X is a genuine friend of Y, then X values Y’s well-being for its own sake, or for
Y’s own sake.”27 My position is precisely that Epicurus holds to the first of these claims – that
“X is a friend of Y” implies that “X values Y’s well-being for its own sake, just as one values his
own well-being.” While there is textual evidence for attributing this valuation condition to
Epicurus, which I discuss in the next chapter, Evans charges that such an attribution would lead
to an inconsistency with Epicurean hedonism because, “[i]f each friend values the other for the
other’s own sake, then presumably each would be disturbed by – and hence has grounds for
worrying about – the other’s suffering, departure, or death.”28 Worrying about such things would
indeed undermine the very reason for choosing to make friends in the first place, as having
friends is supposed to help to avoid worry about future needs; friends are not supposed to create
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new problems that cause additional anxiety. However, Evans’ objection to the valuation
condition is misguided, as valuing a friend’s well-being for its own sake does not necessarily
lead to worrisome problems for an Epicurean when one’s friend dies, departs, or suffers.

Epicureans present multiple arguments that aim to establish that death is not bad for the
person who dies. Lucretius puts forward numerous arguments to this effect (DRN III 830-912),
and some of these mirror Epicurus’ own discussion of death (Ep. Men. 124-127). My friend’s
death is not bad for her on the Epicurean account, so valuing her happiness for its own sake will
not lead me to worry about her death in this regard.
However, it may be argued that I will worry about my friend’s death because her death
will be bad for me, in that, if my friend dies, I will lose the security provided by her friendship.
However, I would likely have other friends whose friendship will allow me to maintain this
security. I also have no more reason to worry about losing security with my friend’s death
because I value her happiness for its own sake than if I did so only as a means to my own ends.
Given the Epicurean position on death, the acceptance of the valuation condition provides no
reason to worry about my friend’s death – it will not be bad for either of us.
My friend’s death, it may be charged, will be bad for me in a second way if the valuation
condition is accepted. I may have some sort of emotional investment in a friend’s well-being, and
her death may cause me emotional pain. This point is also misguided, as Epicureans believe that
“we have within us the capacity to bury past misfortune in a kind of permanent oblivion” (DF I
57). When a friend dies, any emotional pain I may feel, if any, should quickly subside upon
recognition of the fact that her death is not bad for either of us. Once the emotional pain
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subsides, I will be able to contemplate pleasant memories of our friendship,29 and I can
selectively ignore the negative emotions I may have felt at my friend’s death. Of course, I may
not feel any significant negative emotions at losing a friend on my view, as accepting the
valuation condition does not necessitate that I regard a friend as such a unique part of my life that
I am terribly upset by his death. A friend’s death is not especially worrisome, nor is it
problematic within the confines of Epicurean psychology.
Many may feel uncomfortable with such a seemingly cold response to the death of a
friend. However, if one believes that neither one’s friend nor oneself is harmed by the friend’s
death, then it would seem that a friend’s death is not a proper object for prolonged grieving.
Lucretius states, “because you continually crave what is not present and scorn what is, your life
has slipped away from you incomplete and unenjoyed” (DRN III 958-959). The desire to
continue experiencing the emotional pleasures that a dead friend provided in the past is clearly
an inappropriate desire for an Epicurean to have. Removal of such a desire “would relieve
[mourners’] minds of great anguish and fear” (DRN III 901), as one should not desire an end that
is impossible to achieve.30 Thus, while there may be room for some emotional attachment to
friends within Epicureanism, it will be of a limited sort that does not lead to an inordinate
amount of pain when severed. I can desire some emotional satisfaction from being around my
friend, but I can equally recognize that such a desire is inappropriate after my friend’s death, and
I will simply purge myself of this desire when my friend dies, upon recognizing that the desire
has become vain and empty (unnatural and unnecessary).
As for Evans’ claim that I will worry about my friend moving away, it seems that the
ability to blot out memories of painful occurrences in my life will allow me to move on from my
29
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friend’s departure rather quickly and, again, recall the positives of our relationship and ignore the
negatives. As just discussed in regards to death, it is not clear that there is any good reason to
think that accepting the valuation condition will make one overly vulnerable to the loss of a
friend in any capacity, whether death or departure causes the loss. A friend’s departure should not
worry me to any significant degree. Additionally, as in the event of her death, if my friend leaves
me, her role in providing me security can be filled by my making new friends or already having a
sufficient number of other friends to fulfill my needs. Accepting the valuation condition does not
require one to fall apart emotionally when faced with the loss of a friend.
Evans’ final charge against the tenability of the valuation condition for Epicurus is that
valuing my friend for her own sake will result in me being disturbed at, and thus worried about,
my friend’s suffering. However, Epicurus recognized that one will be disturbed at a friend’s
suffering and apparently saw no problems with this fact. Epicureans are supposed to be disturbed
when they see a friend suffering, as “[t]he wise man feels no more pain when he is tortured [than
when his friend is tortured]” (SV 56).31 When faced with a friend in peril, one should assess the
situation, recognize that the friend’s pain is something in need of remedy, and then help to secure
that remedy. There will be some pain associated with seeing a friend in a difficult situation, but
this painful disturbance will lead to action. For Epicureans, the primary value of friendships is
the confidence that friends are willing to help in the time of need, and that one is disturbed by a
friend’s suffering is an integral part of how friendship provides this confidence. Additionally, the
pain of seeing a friend suffering is significantly overshadowed by the pleasure that results from
helping that friend return to a painless state. Epicurus explains that we should “share our friends’
31
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suffering not with laments but with thoughtful concern” (SV 66). Such concern for a friend’s
well-being is a highly desirable aspect of friendship for the Epicurean, as it is what moves one to
help a friend. Since Epicurus recognized and embraced the fact that a friend’s suffering is
disturbing, and since this aspect of friendship plays a crucial role in providing the benefits of
friendship, there is no reason to reject the valuation condition on these grounds.
If, on the other hand, Evans’ point is that one’s reaction to a friend’s suffering should not
be one of grief, then I see no problem here for friends accepting the valuation condition either.
Valuing a friend for her own sake does not necessitate that I will grieve her suffering, anymore
than I will grieve her dying or relocating. In fact, I will have the same reaction to her suffering
that I do to my own – I will try to do whatever is in my power to remove her pain. After all, “the
wise will feel the same way about their friends as they do about themselves. They undertake the
same effort to secure their friends’ pleasure as to secure their own” (DF I 68). There is no room
in Epicureanism for me to pine away in grief over my own suffering, so valuing my friend in the
same way I do myself does not require me to grieve her sufferings.
Evans states, “Certainly Epicurus cannot concede that the sage will value his friends as
ends in themselves, since that would constitute a significant and preventable source of mental
disturbance.”32 This claim is false, and having thus removed this obstacle, in the next chapter I
argue that Epicurean friendship requires the acceptance of the valuation condition.
4

EPICUREAN FRIENDSHIP AS OTHER-REGARDING
Cicero’s On Moral Ends discusses Epicurean friendship most extensively of the ancient

sources that survive today. In Book I, Torquatus outlines three distinct views of friendship that
have been put forward by Epicureans, and in Book II, Cicero argues that Epicurean friendship is
problematic in all three forms. In short, the first type of friendship holds that friendship is to be
32
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sought because of the pleasure it brings about and friends ought to love each other as they love
themselves; the second claims that the initial friendly interaction between two people is
motivated by pleasure, but one begins to value a friend for his/her own sake because of having
developed an intimate familiarity with the other person; and in the third version, Epicurean sages
make a pact to love their friends as much as they do themselves.
Many other sources give a glimpse into the proper way to characterize Epicurean
friendship, but Cicero’s work gives an in-depth look into the view most likely held by Epicurus.
In Book II, Cicero acknowledges that the first view of friendship was held by Epicurus himself
(DF II 82),33 so Torquatus’ first account is a good place to start when trying to figure out the
orthodox Epicurean position on friendship.
In addition to being identified as Epicurus’ own view, Torquatus’ exposition on the first
version of friendship provides the strongest textual support for my position. As I will show in
this chapter, it holds that friendships are valuable only insofar as they bring about tranquility and
that friendship requires valuing a friend’s well-being for its own sake, as one does one’s own
well-being.
4.1

Argument from Cicero’s On Moral Ends
In introducing the first version of friendship, Torquatus states that its proponents “deny

that the pleasures which our friends experience are to be valued in their own right as highly as
those we experience ourselves. This position has been thought to threaten the whole basis of
friendship. But its proponents defend it, and acquit themselves comfortably, so it seems to me”
(DF I 66). If “as highly as” is read as indicating a difference in kind in the values being ascribed
to a friend’s pleasure and one’s own, this passage seems to cut against my position that a friend’s
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pleasure is to be valued in the same way as one’s own. However, Woolf’s translation is slightly
misleading here. The original Latin is “alii, cum eas voluptates quae ad amicos pertinerent
negarent esse per se ipsas tam expetendas quam nostras expeteremus, quo loco videtur
quibusdam stabilitas amicitiae vacillare, tuentur tamen eum locum seque facile, ut mihi videtur,
expediunt.”34 Woolf translates “expetendas” as “to be valued,” whereas the most appropriate
translation of this word is “to be sought.” In fact, a closer translation of the text would be
something like the following: adherents to the first kind of friendship “denied that those
pleasures that pertain to friends are to be sought in and for themselves to such a degree as we are
to seek our own pleasures.”35 Another way this passage has been acceptably translated is that
proponents of the first version of friendship “denied that those pleasures which concerned our
friends were to be sought with as much eagerness for their own sake, as we display in seeking
our own.” 36 There is a difference in degree rather than kind being attributed to one’s own
pleasure and that of a friend. A friend’s pleasure is to be sought for its own sake, just to a lesser
degree than one seeks his own. The denial mentioned in this passage operates as a negation of the
position that a friend’s pleasure is sought as fervently as one’s own, and this negation does not
apply to the pleasures being sought for their own sake. Thus, the best explanation of a friend’s
pleasures being sought “for their own sake” is that a friend’s pleasures are, in fact, valued for
their own sake. It is in this way that we love our friends equally as ourselves (DF I 67), namely,
that we value their pleasure for its own sake, which is the same kind of value we place on our
own pleasure. This reading most naturally corresponds with the rest of Torquatus’ discussion in
which he explains that, on this view, not only do we love our friends as we do ourselves, but we
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also feel the same way towards their pleasures as we do our own (DF I 67-68).37

The way to understand the degree difference mentioned in this passage is that one ought
to seek a friend’s pleasure for its own sake, just not as eagerly as one seeks one’s own pleasure,
as Yonge’s translation indicates. This degree difference in the eagerness with which we seek
something that is valuable in itself is analogous to the way we seek static and kinetic pleasures.
Both are valued for their own sakes, as every pleasure is valuable in itself. However, Epicurus
claims that we are not to seek kinetic pleasures with as much eagerness as we do static pleasures.
So, just as I act towards my own tranquility more fervently than I do sensual stimulation, in
friendship I act towards my own pleasure more eagerly than I do my friend’s. While I value both
our pleasures in the same way, as final ends, I act towards my own more eagerly because my
own tranquility is my ultimate goal in life, my telos. While my friend’s pleasure is to be valued
for its own sake, it is not a value around which I should structure all my desires; I should rather
desire final ends that are most conducive to my own tranquility. My friend’s pleasure happens to
be one such end.
Tim O’Keefe recognizes the difference in degree rather than kind expressed in Torquatus’
exposition of the first kind of Epicurean friendship. He also admits that “[t]his may seem to leave
open the possibility that although friendship is justified instrumentally, nonetheless there might
be an element of intrinsic other-regardingness psychologically.”38 This is precisely my view, and
O’Keefe warns against taking such an interpretive position because he claims that the second
37
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view of friendship is compared to the first in such a way that the first must hold friendship to be
merely instrumentally valuable, whereas the second holds friendship to be intrinsically valuable.
There is also further evidence that the first version of friendship is instrumentally valuable,
which is that it is explicitly said to be on par with the virtues that Epicurus undeniably holds to
be valued in this way (DF I 67). The second version is introduced by Torquatus explaining that
adherents to this theory “fear that if we hold that friendship is to be sought for the sake of our
own pleasure, then the whole notion of friendship will look utterly lame” (DF I 69). These
“later” Epicureans held to a theory of friendship where one aims to become close to others
through a utility calculation, but that this closeness then breeds “real intimacy,” which is the real
reason two people embark on a full-blown friendship (DF I 69). O’Keefe argues that “[t]he
contrast with the first theory is clear: in the first theory, not only is the first approach prompted
by a desire for pleasure, but that desire continues to be one’s sole motive later on, even though
one does love the friend as much as oneself [understood behaviorally].”39 I do not see this
contrast as being nearly as clear as he maintains. While he does argue correctly that the value of
friendship is only instrumental in the first version and that this instrumental valuation of
friendship is being contrasted with the view that friendship is not instrumentally valuable, he
fails to adhere to the distinction I discussed in the last chapter between the value of friendship
and the way one values a friend.
On my view, the first kind of friendship (F1) holds that friendship is chosen because of
the pleasure it affords us and that the well-being of a friend is to be valued for its own sake. The
second version of friendship (F2) holds that friendships are not to be fostered solely because of
the pleasure they provide, but that true friendship comes about because of an intimate emotional
bond, one that is not rationally referable to one’s own pleasure. Cicero claims that the love
39
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between friends in F2 comes about “regardless of any expectation of pleasure” (DF II 82). F2
clearly contrasts with F1, as F2 holds that friendship is not sought solely because of the pleasure
it affords, but rather that it comes about because of a familiarity that has formed between two
people, in the same way that one can fall in love with a pet by being around it for a long time. In
this regard, F2 does not fit with other ancient sources we have that discuss orthodox Epicurean
friendship precisely because it holds that friendships themselves are fostered because of a nonrational affection, rather than because of a utility calculation. This view seems to have been
developed as a deviation from Epicurus’ own in response to Academic criticisms like that of
Cicero, who claims, “Love in turn is not created by a rational calculation of advantage. It arises
of its own accord, spontaneously” (DF II 78). Such criticisms are aimed at the legitimacy of
claiming that friendships form because of an egoistic calculation, and the contrast between F1
and F2 in Torquatus’ account is therefore a difference between the causal impetuses of
friendship, not between the ways in which friends are valued.
There is no need to hold that his exposition of the first view is a misstatement or
“understatement.”40 Nor is there good reason to believe that Torquatus is putting forward the
awkward position that a friend’s pleasure is valued in itself to a lesser degree than our own
because it is not valued in itself at all, as O’Keefe believes.41 Both F1 and F2 hold that friends
should be valued for their own sake; the difference is in how one should seek friendship. F2
seems to be a clear case of “timid” Epicureans backing off of the instrumental value placed on
friendship by Epicurus. When taken in context, there is solid textual evidence for thinking that
such instrumental value does not extend to friends as well according to F1. They are to be valued
for their own sakes, just as Torquatus says they are. We are to “love our friends no less than we
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do ourselves,” in that we value the pleasure of friends for its own sake, as a final end. There is no
indication that a reading like O’Keefe’s is acceptable, nor is it necessary in order to explain the
contrast between F1 and F2 adequately.

My reading does not require any finagling of the text, ascribing misstatements to people,
or the like. That friends should be valued for their own sakes seems to be the view that Cicero
ascribes to Epicurus himself in On Moral Ends.
4.2 Argument from Epicurean egoism
One thing that seems certain under Epicureanism is that friendship is desirable because it
helps one attain tranquility.42 The next logical question is, what kind of friendship is best at
facilitating the attainment of tranquility?
O’Keefe, Evans, and Brown attempt to salvage the Epicureans from consistency concerns
by arguing that friendship is simply not as committed a relationship as others take it to be.
Essentially, they all sidestep a criticism put forward by Annas that, “If we treated friendship
purely instrumentally, we would be allowing not friendship into our lives, but something else.”43
Annas’ point is cast aside in order to give what they believe is the best case for Epicurus.
However, I argue for a view of Epicurean friendship that is consistent with Epicurean hedonism
and involves the acceptance of the valuation condition. My view is thus more like traditional
understandings of friendship.
In light of Epicurus’ claim that we should pursue our own tranquility, I will now show
that reason requires the Epicurean to accept the valuation condition, rather than merely to behave
42
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well towards friends. A community where the valuation condition is accepted will allow for its
members to attain tranquility more effectively than a community where the valuation condition is
rejected.44 Thus, for the Epicurean, a community that accepts the valuation condition is ideal, and
other-regarding friendships should be sought.
My general argument is as follows:
1. Epicurean egoism holds that one should do whatever will result in one’s living a tranquil life.
2. Accepting the valuation condition provides the best opportunity for living a tranquil life.
3. Therefore, Epicurean egoism holds that one should accept the valuation condition.
Premise 1 is uncontroversial. Premise 2 can be shown to be true through the following thought
experiment, wherein I argue that attributing other-regard to Epicureans makes them better at
attaining their primary goal – tranquility.
Suppose there are two similar communities comprised of Epicurean sympathizers.
Friendship plays a prominent role in each community, but in Selfopolis, everyone embraces the
understanding that friendship requires only that a person treat her friends as well as she treats
herself, and the valuation condition is rejected. In Valuationville, on the other hand, everyone
values the well-being of friends in addition to, and in the same way as, one’s own well-being,
thus accepting the valuation condition.
Further suppose that Laura is an Epicurean, and she is deliberating about which
community would be the most rational one to join. As a good Epicurean, what Laura prizes
above all else is her own aponia and ataraxia. Her deliberation primarily consists in determining
which community will provide the greatest opportunity for her to attain these states. Laura
should weigh her two options in regards to which one will be most effective at alleviating her
fears of future danger and suffering.
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In all cases of bodily need, such as the need for drink or food or the need to repel a lion
attack, people in both communities would act similarly towards their friends. In Selfopolis, I help
a friend because doing so gives me security. Onlookers see me as worthy of trust, and, if I didn’t
help, I would either suffer ostracism or be on edge about the possibility of being found out and
then ostracized.45 In Valuationville, I help because my friend’s well-being is among my set of
final ends, even though it is also the case that I am furthering my own interests as well. If Laura
considers extraordinary situations where one’s aponia will be threatened, similar actions will be
undertaken in the communities to remedy a friend being in bodily need. However, these
outwardly identical actions will be motivated differently in the two communities. These
motivational differences will be found in almost all dealings with aponia disruption, as the
relevant differences between Selfopolis and Valuationville are ones of general motivation for
helping a friend in need. Importantly different motivations for action follow from accepting or
rejecting the valuation condition.
If a lion enters Selfopolis and begins to maul John, who is one of Laura’s friends, Laura
will come to his aid. While it may not be in her short-term best interest to do so, as she may be
harmed herself, Laura will realize that failure to help in this situation will show both onlookers
and John that she is not trustworthy or loyal. Thus, any security provided by her friends could be
wholly undermined. So, Laura would help John escape the lion’s clutches because doing so will
be in her own long-term best interest. Undertaking the unfortunately required action of helping
her friend would be a necessary pain for Laura, as it would show others in the community that
she is worthy of their trust and would allow her to avoid ostracism. This will bring a good deal of
security that her future needs will be met.46
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If a lion enters Valuationville and begins to maul Chris, another of Laura’s friends, she
will likewise come to his aid. However, she will do so not merely because she feels pressure
from the community to maintain her loyalty to a friend, but because she actually cares about
Chris’ well-being and values his happiness in the same way she does her own. Chris’ aponia is
being interrupted by this lion attack, so Laura will jump in to try to stop the mauling because
doing so will help her friend return to a less troubled bodily state, a state that Laura holds to be
valuable as a final end that she desires for its own sake. Also, since the kinetic mental pleasure
“joy” occurs when one contemplates experiencing pleasure, Laura can experience joyful pleasure
in helping her friend return to a tranquil state. The helping of a friend, even when it involves selfsacrifice, is pleasurable when the valuation condition is accepted, as one is achieving a final end
by helping a friend back to a painless state. If the valuation condition is rejected, then Laura is
merely undertaking a necessary pain by sacrificing for the sake of a friend, and necessary pains,
while they lead to tranquility, are not pleasurable themselves.47
Thus the following question arises in Laura’s deliberations about which community she
should join: Which kinds of motivations for action are going to be most effective at furthering
Laura’s end of attaining her own aponia and ataraxia? If she joins Valuationville, she must be
motivated by other-regard in many instances, and the question is whether or not this is more
desirable than always being motivated by self-regard. The different motivations that drive people
to help their friends in both communities are not going to impact Laura’s confidence that, were a
lion to attack her, her friends would do everything they could to help, as the different
reasons an Epicurean would not fear dying for a friend.
47
Contemplating one’s own tranquility that results by undertaking necessary pains can be joyful, but a single act of
self-sacrifice does not contribute to achieving tranquility to the same extent as helping a valued friend fight off a lion
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secures by helping a friend and can experience joy in doing so. However, in Valuationville, Laura has an additional
pleasure to contemplate – her own final end’s achievement as her friend returns to a painless state.
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motivations will lead to the same actions in most, if not all cases.48 There is no relevant
difference between the communities in this respect. However, were Laura to have to help one of
her friends who is being attacked by a lion, a significant difference arises between the
motivations for doing so in Selfopolis and Valuationville. This difference has serious
implications for Laura’s ataraxia, as the different motivations are going to carry with them
differing amounts of worry about the future – in Selfopolis, Laura will be faced with worrying
about having to undertake necessary pains for a friend’s well-being without having additional
kinetic mental pleasures to cancel them out and make the self-sacrificing pleasurable.
Recall that the purpose of entering into friendships on the Epicurean account is that doing
so will lead to being confident about attaining aponia in the future. This confidence of one’s
future painlessness is a major constituent of ataraxia. In Selfopolis, Laura’s helping her friend
who is being mauled is motivated solely by her interest in her own well-being. Because of this,
Laura has good reason to worry about having to help her friends in the future – helping may
interrupt her own aponia without providing the opportunity for joy to outweigh the pain.
Scenarios like this are what led J. M. Rist to conclude that Epicureans should only foster a few
friendships because they require too much of oneself in creating the possibility of new instances
where one must sacrifice her own well-being for a friend’s.49 The more friends Laura has, the
higher the chance that she will have to experience pain in the future to help them. Every
friendship Laura forms will significantly increase the chance that she will have to sacrifice her
aponia to aid a friend in need. Thus, each friendship carries with it a reason for Laura to worry
about her ability to maintain her own future aponia. However, in Valuationville, Laura’s worry,
which stems from the chance that her own future aponia may be interrupted in helping a friend,
48
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is counterbalanced by the increased chance that her friend will be able to maintain aponia in the
future, as she values her friend’s future aponia as one of her final ends. This reciprocity is not
present in Selfopolis. Thus, Laura’s worry about her own future aponia will be greater in
Selfopolis than in Valuationville. This worry will detract from Laura’s ataraxia (freedom from
mental disturbances), and so Laura has a very good hedonistic reason to prefer Valuationville
over Selfopolis.
Furthermore, in Valuationville, Laura would not have a negative attitude towards
sacrificing her own aponia to help her friend, as the opportunity to help a friend will bring her
joy. By helping to further her friend’s ends, Laura will also be furthering her own ends in a way
that is not available to her in Selfopolis. Laura’s joy will be able to balance out the bodily pain
experienced at the claws of the lion, in the same way that Epicurus’ joy overshadowed his
excruciating pain as he was dying. However, in Selfopolis, this joy will not be experienced, as
one would feel something closer to extreme dread at the prospect of having to help fight off a
lion. Joy can only arise from self-sacrifice for a friend when the valuation condition is accepted –
helping a friend achieve aponia is only joyful insofar as the friend’s aponia is valued for its own
sake.
According to Plutarch, the Epicureans hold that “benefiting [others] is pleasanter than
receiving benefit.”50 When the valuation condition is accepted, as in Valuationville, benefiting a
friend furthers an end that one values, brings one joy, and helps secure future aponia. When the
valuation condition is rejected, as in Selfopolis, the need to sacrifice for a friend’s benefit is an
unpleasant prospect that may be necessary to maintain future aponia. Laura thus has significant
hedonistic reasons for choosing to live in Valuationville, and in light of Plutarch’s statement on
Epicurean friendship, Valuationville better exhibits the true Epicurean attitude towards
50
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friendship. A community that embraces the valuation condition best allows for living tranquilly;
therefore, Epicurean egoism demands that the valuation be accepted among friends.

5

EPICUREAN FRIENDSHIP AS CONSISTENT WITH HEDONISM
In the last chapter I argued that my interpretation of Epicurean friendship is textually

supported and that such a friendship is more effective than other conceptions at helping achieve
ataraxia, making other-regarding friendship a desirable end under Epicurean egoism. Now I will
explain how coming to have such friendships works in practice – how Epicureans make friends.
5.1

Making Friends
Torquatus does not discuss the practicality of fostering F1 friendships, as he only explains

that one does so because it will result in great pleasure and that friendship requires a mutual
valuation of each other’s well-being. He states, “Epicurus’ view is that of all the things which
wisdom procures to enable us to live happily, there is none greater, richer or sweeter than
friendship” (DF I 65). Such rational reflection, however, can only bring one so far towards
making friends. I am proposing that recognition of the benefits one will attain in accepting the
valuation condition should lead the Epicurean to seek out other-regarding friendships, but how
does one go from such a cost/benefit analysis to fostering real friendships?
Friendships do not usually begin as mutually loving, but often mature into such
relationships. After all, one must make sure that a potential friend has a suitable character to
justify the huge commitment one takes on in fostering a friendship. What I think happens when
an Epicurean like Laura makes a friend is that, once she has decided that she should make
friends, Laura begins acting towards the ends of other people in her community, even though
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they are not yet friends. She does things that make other people happy, as long as doing so is not
seriously detrimental to her own happiness. She tries to become disposed to helping others. In
describing Epicurus’ view on the matter, Diogenes Laertius states that “friendship comes to be
because of its utility; but one must nevertheless make a preliminary sacrifice [for a friend] (for
one must also sow the ground), and it is [then] formed by a sharing among those who are
fulfilled by their pleasures” (DL X 120b). Laura should start helping other people she views as
strong candidates for being good friends. As SV 44 states, “When the wise man is brought face to
face with the necessities of life, he knows how to give rather than receive,” and when Laura is
attempting to make friends, she must give of herself in order to secure the love of another that is
necessary and so beneficial for her own happiness.
In order for friendships to be able to happen, one must begin by approaching others in
the proper way. After two people meet who are open to helping each other achieve happiness and
they strike up good conversation, acquaintance can turn into friendship as they begin to seek
each other’s ends for their own sake. This occurs not out of familiarity, as in the second type of
friendship proposed by Torquatus, but from a mutual sharing in each other’s happiness (DL X
120b). Friendships become possible when the following criteria are met:
1. I am disposed to helping others, even though we are not friends yet (but we will be likeminded Epicureans, as we will be living in a community like Epicurus’ Garden),
2. I meet a person who is likewise disposed to helping others because he finds it rational to do so,
3. Both of us are amenable to fostering a friendship (i.e. there aren’t any deal breakers such as
the inability to tolerate the other’s voice, and both are interested in caring for the well-being of
another for its own sake), and,
4. We are in a situation where we could become friends (this condition would include that neither
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of us plan to leave the community any time soon, commit suicide, or the like).
In seeking friends, one should avoid being “excessively eager for friendship” yet be ready and
open to making reasonable (i.e. not too self-damaging) sacrifices to foster new friendships (SV
28). If two people begin to have a relationship where each desires to treasure the other’s wellbeing, then that is when a friendship is made. Each partner can begin to revel in her friend’s
tranquility in the same way she does her own.
5.2

Hedonistically Motivated Friendship
While giving an overview of Epicurean friendship, O’Keefe argues that the following

problem faces the conception of Epicurean friendship for which I am arguing:
Either (i) the theory is inconsistent in how it describes the final ends of the Epicurean
sage, asserting that the sage values only his own pleasure for its own sake and also that he
values his friends and his friends’ pleasures as much as his own. Or, consistently within
itself, (ii) the theory ascribes an inconsistent set of motives to the wise person, making
him suffer from a serious case of doublethink: the sage values his friends’ pleasures as
much as his own, while recognizing that he does so for the sake of his own pleasure, the
only thing he regards as valuable in itself.51
However, my reading avoids O’Keefe’s dichotomy. Both (i) and (ii) above are only problematic
because they take the end of fostering friendships to be an instrumental end to achieving
pleasure. On my view, however, fostering a friendship functions as what David Schmidtz terms a
maieutic end, not an instrumental one.52
A maieutic end is one that is “achieved through a process of coming to have other
ends.”53 When deliberating about which ends to choose, Laura does an egoistic utility calculation
and finds that she should foster mutually caring friendships, a calculation like the one above
regarding the most beneficial community for her to enter. Such a friendship requires Laura to
adopt her friend’s well-being as one of her final ends. Once she has made a friend, she no longer
51
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continues to pursue the maieutic end of fostering this friendship, as Laura has, in fact, already
achieved this end. Once she has fostered a friendship with Chris, fostering a friendship with him
no longer structures her desires or guides her actions. Instead, Laura’s desires are structured and
her actions guided by the new set of ends she has adopted, which includes assuring Chris’
tranquility. Thus, O’Keefe’s doublethink charge is no longer relevant, as it is a
mischaracterization to say that Laura values Chris’ pleasure for the sake of her own pleasure.
A clear example of how this works can be taken from my own life. When contemplating
in college whether to choose to pursue the end of loving my wife, or as I thought of it at the time,
of allowing myself to fall in love with her, I determined that doing so would lead to the happiest
life I could foresee having. Now, I love my wife and enjoy making sacrifices for her well-being. I
chose to make her well-being one of my final ends. If asked “Why do you sacrifice your pleasure
for your wife’s well-being?” my response is “because I love her, part of which involves valuing
her well-being for its own sake.” If asked why I chose to love my wife, I may respond by
acknowledging that I foresaw loving my wife as making me happier than competing scenarios in
which I chose not to love my wife. Thus, I pursued the maieutic end of falling in love with my
wife because it was rational to do so, just as Laura will pursue the maieutic end of fostering a
loving friendship with Chris because it is rational to do so. Once I did fall in love with my wife,
my desires were no longer structured by the maieutic end of falling in love with her, just as, once
Laura fosters a friendship with Chris, her desires will no longer be structured by the maieutic end
of fostering such a friendship. My maieutic end had been achieved by my taking my wife’s wellbeing to be my own final end, just as Laura’s maieutic end has been achieved by taking Chris’
well-being to be her own final end. So, the problematic statement of doublethink expressed
above must be amended to the less dubious “Laura cares about her friend for his own sake, and
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doing so is in Laura’s best interest.” While Laura can correctly describe her friendship as being
in her best interest and even though she was motivated to seek out friends because doing so was
foreseen to be in her best interest, she is not motivated by her own interests in the pursuit of her
friend’s tranquility.
5.3

Objections and Replies
One may object to my position on Epicurean friendship by claiming that entering such a

community may require Laura to enter into a type of friendship that, given Epicurus’
psychological hedonism, requires giving more of herself than is actually possible. This objection
is similar to O’Keefe’s (i.) quoted above. In other words, it may be the case that, as Annas
claims, “Epicurus can generate other-concern, but not enough other-concern for the agent to be
prepared to accept great losses for the sake of other people.”54 Perhaps Laura cannot bring
herself to take another’s ends as her own solely because she recognizes the benefits of doing so.
However, Epicureans hold that ends are choose-able, such that one can limit her ends to include
only those that are natural and necessary.55 This is reason to grant that the Epicurean sage can
adopt another’s pleasure as her own final end. Laura finds that valuing her friend’s ends as she
does her own is rational, as doing so will help Laura attain ataraxia. This fact should be able to
motivate her to sacrifice her own immediate pleasure out of genuine care for her friend’s pleasant
state, if doing so would help a friend attain greater pleasure.
Further evidence that such an adoption of ends is possible under Epicureanism is that
Epicurus held that one can cease fearing death and the wrath of the gods in the afterlife upon
reason’s revelation that death is annihilation (DRN III 830-912). If finding out death is not bad
for Laura can stop her from fearing death, then reason’s revelation that fostering other-regarding
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friendships is in her best interest should be able to motivate her to do so on the Epicurean view.
Such a position is consistent within Epicurean psychology.
Perhaps the most serious problem with my reply to this objection is that it may be seen to
run counter to KD XXV: “If you do not, on every occasion, refer each of your actions to the goal
of nature, but instead turn prematurely to some other [criterion] in avoiding or pursuing [things],
your actions will not be consistent with your reasoning.”56 However, this saying should not be
understood to require that each and every action must be referred to, as in motivated by, one’s
own pleasure.57 Such an interpretation, which would pose problems for my position on
Epicurean friendship, results in an utterly unworkable and naive principle. One cannot possibly
perform a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether every individual action one takes is in one’s
own best interest – this would be too time consuming and impractical, making it a chore to figure
out whether or not one should brush one’s teeth each morning, among innumerable other
mundane, yet beneficial actions. If nothing else, such a requirement would bring a ton of anxiety
into one’s life that would severely undermine one’s tranquility. Also, the Greek word “Kairos,”
translated here as “on every occasion,” is amenable to meaning “at every point of decision that
would require rational deliberation,” which fits with a reading that allows one to foster habits
that are not always referred to one’s own pleasure.
KD XXV should be taken to require that every action should be referable to the goal of
nature – a given action must be able to be shown to be in one’s own best interest. Or to put this
another way, the following conditional must hold: if I were to query whether a given action is in
my best interest, then I must be able to answer the query in the affirmative. As Russell correctly
argues, referring every action to one’s pleasure does not imply that every action is motivated for
56
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the sake of one’s own pleasure.58 The above conditional can be met without my being motivated
by my own self-interest in everything I do. I have argued earlier that accepting the valuation
condition is in one’s best interest, so this Principal Doctrine poses no problem for my position.
One final objection to my position is that Epicurus generally recommends limiting the
ends one should pursue to only those that are natural and necessary, and perhaps my view
requires one to desire too many ends. However, I do not think that accepting the valuation
condition expands the number of one’s ends in any detrimental way. In fact, while each person in
an Epicurean community, taken individually, will have more final ends on my view than if the
valuation condition is rejected, there will be multiple people aiming to achieve each person’s
ends. All of my friends will be aiming for my painless state, in addition to their own. This is
highly desirable for me, and the community as a whole will not see an increase in the ends that
are being pursued within it, but rather in the number of people pursuing each end. Each person’s
tranquility will count as a final end within the community whether or not the valuation condition
is accepted, and there is no net increase in the number of ends in a community that accepts the
valuation condition over one that rejects it. On my view, there are multiple people pursuing each
person’s tranquility. This is a highly desirable consequence of living in a community like
Valuationville.
6

CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I have made the case that Epicurean friendship requires friends to value

each other’s pleasure in the same way that they do their own. This understanding of Epicurean
friendship has many benefits when compared to the views espoused by other Epicurean scholars.
Furthermore, when the ends of fostering friendships are properly characterized as maieutic, the
acceptance of the valuation condition has been shown to be consistent with Epicurean hedonism.
58
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While this thesis provides support for thinking that Epicurus held friends to be valued for their
own sakes and that this view is consistent with his version of egoistic hedonism, it is yet to be
seen whether an account similar to his is a viable solution for egoistically motivating genuine
other-regarding concern. My depiction of Epicurean friendship relies on contentious
psychological claims, including that one can manipulate her desires to make them accord with
reason and that people are said to have the ability to consign negative memories into oblivion.
However, these psychological positions were held by Epicurus, and so his view on friendship can
and should be expounded with their acceptance granted. It is yet to be seen whether otherregarding friendships are plausible on more contemporary views of egoism and hedonism, but
the success of Epicurus in providing a coherent account of how this can work does at least
provide some hope that such an endeavor is possible.
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